Criminal Procedure in the  Land of Oz : Lessons for America by Bradley, Craig M.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1990
Criminal Procedure in the "Land of Oz": Lessons
for America
Craig M. Bradley
Indiana University Maurer School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bradley, Craig M., "Criminal Procedure in the "Land of Oz": Lessons for America" (1990). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 688.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/688
0091-4169/90/8101-0099
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 81, No. I
Copyright 0 1990 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN THE "LAND
OF OZ": LESSONS FOR AMERICA
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a land lolling in the warm embrace of a benevolent
sun, where the people are happy and prosperous and everyone lives
near pristine, uncrowded beaches. Such a country is the Land of
Oz-Australia,l a vast English speaking former British colony cur-
rently populated by people of diverse ethnic and racial origins. Aus-
tralia's legal system, like America's, is drawn from the British
common law, and it has a federal system much like our own. It
seems especially likely that Australians would be concerned about
police illegality since, in such areas as child care and environmental
concerns, Australia seems more "liberal" than America. Moreover,
Australia has a lower crime rate than America, 2 and Australians typi-
cally display an antipathy for police-perhaps stemming from the
country's origins as a penal colony-that is at least the equal of
Americans'. 3 Consequently, a study of the Australian criminal pro-
* Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School of
Law. The research for this article was conducted while the Author was a Senior Ful-
bright Scholar at the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. The Author
wishes to express his appreciation to the Australian American Educational Foundation
for its financial support of this research and to the Australian National University Faculty
of Law for its assistance in all aspects of this project. Special thanks to Yale Kamisar of
the University of Michigan, Lauren Robel and Joseph Hoffman of Indiana University,
and David Feldman, Geoff Lindell, and Peter Waight of the Australian National Univer-
sity for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this work.
1 The Australian pronunciation of "Aussie" sounds like "Ozzie," which is probably
why Australians frequently refer to their country as "the land of Oz." Cf. A. LAUDER,
LET STALK STRINE (1965).
2 From July 1, 1987, to June 30, 1988, there were 1.93 murders, 88.93 serious as-
saults, 16.03 rapes, and 48.3 robberies per 100,000 population in Australia. Telephone
Interview with the Australian Institute of Criminology (June 17, 1989). By contrast, in
1988 in the United States there were 8.4 murders and non-negligent manslaughters,
370.2 aggravated assaults, 37.6 forcible rapes, and 220.9 robberies per 100,000 popula-
tion. FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 47 (1988).
3 "The ambivalent attitude of the Australian community toward the police, who are
often regarded as a necessary evil, can engender in the police an isolated and fortress
mentality .... P. SALLMAN &J. WILLIS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AUSTRALIA 3 (1984).
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cedure system would seem to be an ideal source for constructive
approaches to problems that might be useful in America.
Alas, current Australian criminal procedure does not bear out
this expectation. In most respects, it is where America's was in the
mid-1950s. The "voluntariness" test as to confessions is the only
basis for mandatory evidentiary exclusion, there is little federal con-
trol over state procedures, and police generally "exercise personal
power undisturbed by thoughts that there will ever be an accounting
for its use."' 4 Moreover, "[i]n a sphere of activity involving issues of
fundamental human liberty the governing rules are unclear, uncer-
tain, out of date, difficult to find and understand and thus quite un-
suitable for the age in which we live." 5
But while the current Australian law of criminal procedure pro-
vides nothing to emulate, it is worth studying for two reasons. First,
because of Australia's similarity to the United States, it may be seen
as a laboratory where a "discretionary" or balancing approach to
evidentiary exclusion, often put forward as an alternative by critics
of the American approach, 6 is being tested. This Article discusses
the failure of that "test." 7
4 REPORT OF THE BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW IN
QUEENSLAND 91 (1977) [hereinafter LUCAS REPORT].
5 P. SALLMAN AND J. WILLIS, supra note 3, at 20.
6 A good discussion of the balancing approach, whereby evidence is only excluded if
the "societal costs of imposing the rule do not exceed the benefits of the enforcement of
the rule," is found in State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 270, 689 P.2d 519, 529 (1982) (Cam-
eron, J., concurring); Cameron & Lustiger, The Exclusionary Rule: A Cost Benefit Analysis,
101 F.R.D. 109, 142-52 (1984); see also Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 1027, 1046 (1974) (proposing the abandonment of exclusionary rules in certain
specified "serious" cases such as murder and kidnapping); Wright, Must the Ciminal Go
Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REV. 736, 744 (1972) (the rule should only apply
in cases of "outrageous" police misconduct). The balancing approach is generally used
in West Germany and other European countries. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Ger-
many, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032, 1033 n.5, 1035 (1983). But see Kamisar, "Comparative Repre-
hensibility" and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1987)
(criticizing balancing approach).
7 In Australia, as in Great Britain and other Commonwealth countries, "this discre-
tion [vested in the trial judge to exclude evidence as he sees fit] is very rarely acted on."
NEW SOUTH WALES LAw REFORM COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER ON ILLEGALLY AND IM-
PROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 15 (1979).
The Australian Law Reform Commission similarly found that "the weaknesses of
[the current] remedies [for police misconduct] are such that if continued in their present
form they render irrelevant, in terms of their practical effect [any reform of the rules of
criminal procedure]." LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT No. 2 (INTERIM), CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION 98 (1975) [hereinafter LRC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION] (referring to civil
suits and police disciplinary procedures as well as judicial exclusion).
In addition to the LUCAS REPORT, supra note 4, see REPORT OF THE BOARD OF IN-
QUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE VICTORIA POLICE FORCE (1978)
[hereinafter BEACH REPORT]; THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT No. 38, EVIDENCE
(1987) [hereinafter LRC EVIDENCE].
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The second aspect of Australian law that is of interest is the
Australian Law Reform Commission's proposals.8 The most com-
pelling of these to an American is generally taken for granted by
Australians: criminal procedure rules should be declared by statute,
not case law.9 Already, rules of criminal procedure in Australia are
partly statutory at the state level. The Law Reform Commission
proposes to make them so at the federal level and to provide a com-
prehensive model for reform of state statutes. This Article discusses
the current Australian rules of criminal procedure, and the Aus-
tralians' unsuccessful endeavor to enforce these rules through a
"balancing" or discretionary approach to evidentiary exclusion.
Second, it discusses the statutory reforms currently being consid-
ered in Australia and provides a critique of these proposals.
Finally, drawing on the Australian experience, the Article con-
cludes that while a balancing approach is not the appropriate rem-
edy for criminal procedure violations by the police, the Australians
are correct in utilizing statutory, as opposed to court-made, rules of
criminal procedure. In Australia these rules must necessarily be en-
acted by each state. In America, by contrast, I argue that Congress
can and should enact such a statutory scheme applicable to all the
states pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment.' 0
II. AUSTRALIAN RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Since Australia's rules of criminal procedure do not differ
greatly from the United States's and, in any event, can usually be
8 Thus far the Law Reform Commission has succeeded in having two bills intro-
duced into Parliament-the Criminal Investigation Bills of 1976 and 1981--only to have
them defeated by police opposition.
In response to the Criminal Investigation Bill of 1981, the President of the Police
Federation of Australia and New Zealand threatened a police strike if implementation of
the act would result in the sanctioning of police officers. 26 REFORM 63 (Apr. 1982).
Senator Evans (then Attorney General) "suggested that the police response to the Bill
demonstrated 'a profound indifference to the constraints of existing law.'" Id.
However, there is reason to believe that currently pending efforts may be more
successful. Telephone interview with Stephen Mason, Secretary and Director of Re-
search, Law Reform Commission (March 2, 1989). In part, this optimism is based on the
fact that Victoria, a state noted for a particularly obdurate police union in the past, P.
SALLMAN &J. WILLIS, supra note 3, at 18, has recently enacted a bill calling for 1) the tape
(or video) recording of all statements made by defendants in custody and 2) the warning
of such defendants as to their rights to counsel and silence. Crimes Custody and Investi-
gation Act, Vict. Acts §§ 464A(3), 464C(1)(b), 464G, 464H (1988). See infra notes 23-25
and accompanying text.
9 "It is generally accepted that what is needed is a comprehensive code setting out
with as much particularity as possible the rights and duties of police, suspects and others
concerned in the criminal investigation process." LRC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, supra
note 7, at 23.
10 See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
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freely ignored by the police, the Article will not devote extended
discussion to them. It will instead focus on the statutes of New
South Wales and Victoria, where over half of Australia's population
lives.' I At the outset, it must be noted that these rules have no con-
stitutional foundation, as in America, because Australia has no
equivalent to our Bill of Rights. The rules of criminal procedure are
declared by the various state parliaments, by state courts drawing on
the common law, or by the High Court of Australia in its capacity as
the highest court of each state.
A. STOP AND SEARCH
The New South Wales Crimes Act of 1900 provides for the stop
and search of persons or vehicles reasonably suspected of "having
or conveying any thing stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained or
any thing used or intended to be used in the commission of an in-
dictable offence." 12 Police may enter a house to arrest without a
warrant on reasonable suspicion' 3 and may search the person and
the premises incident to the arrest. 14
The Search Warrant. Act of 1985 provides that 1) search war-
rants may be issued if there are reasonable grounds for believing
that on any premises there is "a thing connected with a particular
[specified] offence," and 2) the warrant must specify the things for
which the search is conducted. 15 It further provides for 1) the
seizure of other evidence found on the premises on "reasonable
11 However, since the Australian High(est) Court functions as the highest court of
each state rather than as a court of limited jurisdiction like the United States Supreme
Court, there is no jurisdictional bar to its declaring rules of procedure based on "com-
mon law." In theory these rules are only applicable to the state involved in the case
before the Court, but in practice the states follow such pronouncements by the High
Court.
12 Crimes Act of 1900, N.S.W. Stat. § 357E(a) (Supp. 1979). "Reasonable suspicion"
in Australia seems to mean the same thing as "probable cause" in America. See J.
OXLEY-OXLAND, N.S.W. POLICE LAw HANDBOOK 1001 (1988). [hereinafter N.S.W.
HANDBOOK].
For an interesting historical discussion of the development of these terms in the law
of search and seizure, see Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of
Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465, 478-495 (1984). "Three hundred years after
Hale, English judges still use such terms as 'reasonable suspicion,' 'reasonable and
probable cause' and 'reasonable and probable cause for suspicion' interchangeably." Id.
at 488.
i J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 50 (1983); Crimes Act of 1900, N.S.W. Stat. § 352
(Supp. 1979); Crimes Act, Vict. Acts § 459(b) (1958).
14 p. GILLIES, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 212 (1982). Cf Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (restricting this common law rule in America).
15 Search Warrant Act of 1985, N.S.W. Stat. §§ 5, 6; see also Crimes Act, Vict. Acts
§ 465 (1958).
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grounds for believing it is connected with any offence," 16 2) the
search, on reasonable suspicion, of people found on the premises,
17
and 3) telephonic warrants "in case of urgent need."' 8
South Australia stands in contrast to the particularity require-
ments of Victoria and New South Wales:
In South Australia the Commissioner of Police may issue general
search warrants to members of the police force as he thinks fit. The
member of the police force named in the warrant may at any time of
the day or night, with such assistants as he thinks necessary, break
open and search any premises where he has reasonable grounds to
suspect: that a felony or misdemeanor has been recently committed or
is about to be committed; that the premises contain stolen goods; that
there is anything which may afford evidence of the commission of a
felony or misdemeanor; or that there is anything which may be in-
tended to be used to commit these offences. Any goods or things sat-
isfying these criteria may be seized. The warrant may be granted for a
period of up to six months and revoked at any point of time within that
period. Similar powers exist in Tasmania and the Australian Capital
Territory but only in respect of stolen goods. 19
B. INTERROGATION
Unlike the law of search, which is largely statutory in all Austra-
lian states, the law of interrogation has been developed through
case law throughout Australia and is less clear. In general,
A person who has been charged with an offence does not have to
answer a question put to him by a police officer. He still has a right to
remain silent.
The police officer should advise him of his right in words similar
to those laid down in the original judges' Rules: "Do you wish to say
anything in answer to the charge? You are not obliged to say anything
unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say will be taken down in
writing and may be given in evidence." '20
While this is what the police are supposed to do, the High
Court has made it clear that "the [British Judges'] rules may be re-
garded in a general way as prescribing a standard of propriety" 21
rather than a rigid requirement, and failure to follow them will not
16 Search Warrant Act of 1985, N.S.W. Stat. § 7.
17 Search Warrant Act of 1985, N.S.W. Stat. § 8.
18 Search Warrant Act of 1985, N.S.W. Stat. § 12. Victoria, apparently, does not al-
low telephonic warrants. See Crimes Act, Vict. Acts § 465.
19 J. BISHOP, supra note 13, at 75 (citations omitted). Bishop, joined by the Australian
Law Reform Commission, condemns these general warrants. Id. at 75-76.
20 N.S.W. HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 301.
21 Van der Meer v. R., 62 A.LJ.R. 656, 666 (Austl. 1988) (quoting R. v. Lee, 82
C.L.R. 133, 154 (Austl. 1950)).
CRAIG M. BRADLEY
necessarily lead to evidentiary exclusion.22 Victoria recently clari-
fied the law in this area by enacting a comprehensive statute gov-
erning interrogations. This statute requires police to inform suspects
"in custody" of their rights to both silence and counsel23 and to
tape record the statements of any person who "was suspected or
ought reasonably to have been suspected of having committed an
offence." 24 The statute prescribes no remedy for violation of the
warnings requirements but provides that untaped statements are
"inadmissible."-25 This is designed to counteract police "verbal-
ling" (fabrication of oral confessions) which, as the Australian High
Court has recognized, is a significant problem in Australia. 26 No
other state has yet adopted a similar preventative measure.27
C. SPEEDY TRIAL AND COUNSEL
Two other aspects of the Australian system of criminal proce-
dure deserve brief mention: the absence of an unequivocal right
either to a speedy trial or to counsel.
As to counsel, in the High Court case of Mclnnis v. R. 28 the de-
fendant was convicted of rape even though his counsel did not ap-
22 Id.; LRC EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 91. In the Australian Capital Territory, how-
ever, the prosecution will not offer a defendant's statements into evidence unless the
caution has been given. Id.
23 Crimes Act, Vict. Acts §§ 464A(3), 464C(1)(b) (1988). Further, the police "must
defer the questioning and investigation for a time that is reasonable ... to enable the
person to make or attempt to make, the communication" (with counsel) subject to an
exigent circumstances exception. Vict. Acts § 464C(I). However, "custody" is defined
as people "under lawful arrest" or as to whom "there is sufficient information ... to
justify the arrest," Vict. Acts § 464(1), allowing the provisions to be avoided in the early
stages of an investigation. There is a limit, however, since "neither at common law nor
generally speaking under statute is a policeman empowered to detain a person for the
purpose of interrogation." P. GILLIES, supra note 14, at 10.
24 Crimes Act, Vict. Acts § 464H(1). This section does not only apply to people "in
custody."
25 Id. This rule is subject to certain exceptions: statements made prior to question-
ing can be used if the suspect confirms them on tape, Crimes Act, Vict. Acts
§ 464H(1)(c), or under "exceptional circumstances" which "justify the admission of the
evidence," Crimes Act, Vict. Acts § 464H(2). Alaska is, apparently, the only American
state to have such a requirement. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE 506 (7th ed. 1989). See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985)
(providing for mandatory exclusion of statements that are not electronically recorded).
26 "[Tjhere has been a significant number of occasions when unsigned records of
interview have been proved to be false." Carr v. R., 165 C.L.R. 314, 321 (Austl. 1988)
(Wilson & Dawson, JJ.). The High Court accordingly requires trial judges to exercise
caution before convicting on the basis of disputed confessional evidence. Id. at 321-22.
27 The Law Reform Commission has proposed that such a requirement be adopted
as to federal police. LRC EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 169-70 (Draft Legislation § 74).
28 143 C.L.R. 575 (Austl. 1979). Counsel had withdrawn at the last minute when he
learned that he would not be paid because the defendant's application for legal aid had
been denied. The defendant's motion for a continuance was denied. Id. at 578.
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pear for trial (through no fault of the defendant's) and despite his
request that the trial be postponed. The High Court, affirming the
conviction, recognized that a defendant generally should be af-
forded counsel but held that "an accused does not have a right to be
provided with counsel at public expense," and that because of the
strong case against the- defendant, there was no "miscarriage ofjus-
tice." 29 Therefore, while there is no absolute right to counsel,
counsel is usually provided.
A speedy trial, by contrast, is regularly denied. Recently, a
Supreme CourtJustice in New South Wales resigned in protest over
the "scandalous" and "obscene" delays in criminal trials, which
have regularly led to people being incarcerated for over a year
pending trial.30 The ChiefJustice of Australia has similarly decried
these delays, 3 1 and the High Court has a case pending before it in
which the defendant's attorneys are asking for a permanent stay of
proceedings, on speedy trial grounds, in a case that was delayed for
over five years between the arraignment and the trial. 32
Beyond these examples, in a country which has no written Bill
of Rights, even the most well established common law rights-such
as the privilege against self-incrimination-are always subject to
parliamentary overruling, as the High Court recently held.3 3
29 Id. at 579-80. This result is not unique to Australia. In numerous cases in Eng-
land and those following the English tradition, courts have declined to set aside the
conviction of an accused who was "unrepresented without his fault." Id. at 589 (Mur-
phy, J.), In America, by contrast, "actual or constructive denial of the assistance of
counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice." Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). The "harmless error" approach was used in the United States
until Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
30 Sydney Morning Herald, Feb. 10, 1989, at 1. The Supreme Court of each state
consists of a group ofjudges who alternate between sitting individually as trial judges to
try the most serious cases in the state and in panels of three to hear appeals from those
cases. In the latter capacity, they form the highest court of the state, and their decisions
are appealable only to the High Court of Australia.
31 Canberra Times, Mar. 21, 1989, at 10. "Sir Anthony [Mason] was particularly crit-
ical of the situation in [New South Wales], where the average length of time spent by an
accused in custody between committal... and trial in the District Court was 10 months.
In the Supreme Court [where more serious cases are tried] that delay was now an aver-
age of nine months." Id.
32 Canberra Times, Apr. 12, 1989, at 7. But see Duke v. R., 83 A.L.R. 650 (1989)
(High Court affirming on other grounds the conviction in South Australia of a defendant
who had been imprisoned in New South Wales on another charge, despite a seven year
delay between arrest and trial). Contra Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (reversing a
conviction on speedy trial grounds).
33 In Hamilton v. Oades, 7 A.C.L.C. 381 (Austl. Apr. 12, 1989), the High Court held
that § 541(12) of the Companies Code of New South Wales had abrogated the privilege
in the investigation of certain corporate improprieties.
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III. ENFORCING THE RULES THROUGH EVIDENTIARY EXCLUSION
In Mapp v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court held that
without an exclusionary rule-a requirement that illegally obtained
evidence be suppressed-the constitutional prohibition against "un-
reasonable federal searches and seizures would be 'a form of words,'
valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of ines-
timable human liberties.13 4
Australians have not subscribed to this view, adhering instead
to the British common law approach that generally allows the admis-
sion of almost any evidence, regardless of how obtained.3 5 How-
ever, in theory, though rarely in practice, the Australian High Court
has diverged somewhat from the British view.3 6
A. MANDATORY EXCLUSION
An exception to the non-exclusionary approach is found in the
long established, common law rule, based on a concern for reliabil-
ity, that statements that have not been voluntarily given must be sup-
pressed. This rule was summarized in 1948 by Judge Dixon in
McDermott v. R. :3
If he [the accused] speaks because he is overborne his confessional
statement cannot be received in evidence and it does not matter by
what means he has been overborne. If the statement is the result of
duress, intimidation, persistent importunity, or sustained or undue in-
34 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (Holmes, J.)). The Australian Law Reform
Commission agrees:
Rights without remedies may be no more than rhetoric; duties without sanctions for
their breach may as well not be imposed .... [The great failing of criminal proce-
dure hitherto has not so much been its principles . . . but rather the failure of the
law on the ground to conform with the law on the books.
LRC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, supra note 7, at 136.
35 "It matters not how you get [evidence]; if you steal it even, it would be admissible
in evidence ...... R. v. Leathan, 121 E.R. 589 (England 1861).
36 Bunning v. Cross, 141 C.L.R. 54, 73 (Austl. 1978) (Stephen & Aickin, JJ., joined
by Barwick, CJ.). See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
Thus Australia, to a limited extent, further disproves the belief of American con-
servatives, as expressed by former Chief Justice Burger, that the exclusionary rule is
"unique to Americanjurisprudence." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (197 1) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); see also Bradley,
supra note 6 (puncturing claim that exclusionary rule is unique to the United States).
Unlike Germany, however, Australia does not seem to have different cultural concerns
that call for exclusion in some cases where America would not require it, Bradley, sup-a
note 6, at 1058, although there are isolated examples of this. See infra note 94 and ac-
companying text. Canada has also adopted a rule of evidentiary exclusion due to police
misconduct. Constitution Act, Can. Stat. § 24(2) (1982); see MacDougall, The Exclusionary
Rule and Its Alternatives-Remedies for Constitutional Violations in Canada and the United States,
76J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 608 (1985).
37 76 C.L.R. 501, 511 (Austl. 1948).
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sistence or pressure, it cannot be voluntary. But it is also a definite
rule of the common law that a confessional statement cannot be volun-
tary if it is preceded by an inducement held out by a person in author-
ity and the inducement has not been removed before the statement
was made.
The burden of proof is on the prosecution to show, on the "bal-
ance of probability," that the statement was voluntary.5 8 Despite
frequent mention of this rule in High Court decisions, it has rarely
been invoked.3 9 There is no other mandatory rule of exclusion gen-
erally applicable in Australia. 40
B. DISCRETIONARY EXCLUSION
Beyond the "involuntariness" basis for 'exclusion, there are
three other possible grounds, all of which are discretionary with the
trial judge, who is at least obliged to consider Whether that discretion
should be exercised.4 1
1. The "Prejudice" Discretion
The first of these is self-evident: "a confession [and indeed any
38 Johnston, The Exclusionary Rule and Other Controls Over the Abuse of Power by Police, 54
AusTL. L.. 466, 467 (1980) (citing dicta in Wendo v. R., 109 C.L.R. 559, 562, 572
(Austl. 1963)).
39 See P. WAIGHT & C. WILLIAMS, CASES AND MATERIAL ON EVIDENCE 735 (2d ed.
1985) (citing two Australian and a handful of other British Commonwealth cases over a
period of 40 years as "some of the very few reported cases where a confession has been
excluded because of persistent police questioning"). The Australian cases are R. v. Bur-
nett, 1944 V.L.R. 115, and R. v.Jones, I N.S.W.R. 190 (1970). InJones, the defendant
had been interrogated for 17 1/2 hours over a period of 28 3/4 hours, including a 14
hour period of almost continuous questioning from 7:30 p.m. to 9:30 a.m. the next day.
The trial judge excluded the confession, not because it was involuntary (mandatory ex-
clusions) but in the exercise of discretion, concluding that it would be "unfair" to use it.
In R. v. Fewster (Queensl. Apr. 1979), in THE CRIMINAL INJUSTICE SYSTEM 106, 277 (J.
Basten ed. 1982), the defendant, who had been hit in the mouth at the time of arrest,
was told that "if he didn't give a statement the police officers would come down on him
as hard as possible." The confession was excluded.
40 In New South Wales, however, there is a statutory requirement that, in addition to
the above stated rules, no confession may be received into evidence if it has been in-
duced by any "untrue representation" made to the defendant. Crimes Act of 1900,
N.S.W. Stat. § 410(1)(a) (Supp. 1979). By contrast, a Victorian statute specifically limits
the common law rule of McDermott, providing that a "confession" should not be inadmis-
sible if induced by "promise or threat" unless "that inducement was really calculated to
cause an untrue admission of guilt to be made." Evidence Act, Vict. Acts § 149 (1958).
The New South Wales courts have never actually excluded a confession pursuant to this
section. See generally P. WAIGHT & C. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 742. Rather, they have
limited it to knowingly untrue statements of the police made with the object of obtaining
a confession from the suspect. Compare R. v. Thompson, 62 N.S.W. St. R. 135 (1961)
with Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (affirming on other grounds the convic-
tion of a suspect whose confession had been induced by police prevarication).
41 R. v. Ireland, 126 C.L.R. 321, 335 (Austl. 1970).
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evidence tendered by the prosecution] can be rejected when its pro-
bative value is low and its prejudicial effect is great." This discre-
tion has apparently never been exercised in a defendant's favor.42
2. The "Unfairness" Discretion
The second ground for discretionary exclusion is that a volun-
tary confession may be excluded if "it would be unfair to use it in
evidence against [the defendant]." 43 There has been considerable
confusion about whether this "unfairness" refers to misconduct by
the police or to concerns about the unreliability of the statement.44
Recently, however, a majority of the High Court made it clear that
the latter concerned the Court: "[u]nfairness, in this sense, is con-
cerned with the accused's right to a fair trial, a right which may be
jeopardized if a statement is obtained in circumstances which affect
the reliability of the statement."'45
Thus, the Court has implicitly endorsed the earlier statement by
ChiefJustice Latham in McDermott that "examples of such unfairness
would be afforded by irresponsibility by the accused on the occasion
when the statement was made or failure on his part to understand
and appreciate the effect of questions and answers."' 46 This cate-
gory of discretion would not apply to the finding of real evidence
which could not be rendered unreliable by the means by which it
was obtained. 47
However, while court opinions refer to this discretion with rela-
tive frequency,48 only two cases could be found, both of trial courts,
42 p. WAIGHT & C. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 750; see also Driscoll v. R., 137 C.L.R.
517, 541 (Austl. 1977); R. v. Tetlow, 27 A. Crim. R. 198, 200 (N.S.W. Crim. App. 1986);
R. v. Gidley, 3 N.S.W.L.R. 168, 172-73 (1984) (None of these cases involved the actual
exclusion of confessional evidence on the basis of prejudice; rather, they stated the prin-
ciple that it could be done.).
43 McDermott v. R., 76 C.L.R. 501, 506-07, 517 (Austl. 1948) (Latham, CJ., & Wil-
liams, J.); see also R. v. Lee, 82 C.L.R. 133, 154-55 (Austl. 1950).
44 "[I]t will be apparent that an element of ambiguity has been introduced into this
branch of the law." P. GILLIES, supra note 14, at 101 (see also Gillies's discussion begin-
ning at page 102).
45 Van der Meer v. R., 62 A.LJ.R. 656, 666 (Austl. 1988) (Wilson, Dawson & Too-
hey, JJ.) (emphasis added).
46 McDermott, 76 C.L.R. at 507; see also Ostojic v. R., 18 S.A. St. R. 188, 197 (1978)
(Wells, J., joined by Hogarth & King, JJ.) ("I can imagine cases in which a trial judge
might exercise this discretionary power where no [police] impropriety existed. A sus-
pect might be suffering hidden but naturally occurring pain, [or] he might have sus-
tained severe shock .... ).
47 But see infra note 54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the third head of
discretion.
48 See generally cases discussed in P. GILLIES, supra note 14, at 98-127; P. WAIGHT & C.
WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 771-73.
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in which it was actually exercised.
In Klemenko v. Huffa,49 the South Australian Supreme Court re-
versed the defendant's conviction for possession of stolen property
on the ground that psychiatric testimony showed that he was insane
at the time he gave his statement to the police and the magistrate
had not considered whether or not to exercise his discretion.50 In a
study of all indictable cases that were concluded in the Sydney Dis-
trict Courts in a six week period there was, among the 147 cases,
only one in which the judge excluded the confession of a defendant,
a heroin addict, who was "physically debilitated and under heavy
medication" and exhibited a "very markedly clouded
consciousness."51
In contrast, in several cases the courts, including the High
Court, have upheld the admission of confessions when it seemed
that the confessions should have been excluded due to the defend-
ants' incapacity. In Basto v. R.,52 the confession was admitted de-
spite the fact that the defendant was both suffering from an
overdose of drugs which he had taken for the purpose of commit-
ting suicide and deemed insane later the same day. In R. v.
Starecki,5s the defendant's statement had been taken after he had
shot himself in the brain.
3. The "Police Misconduct" Discretion
The final basis for discretionary exclusion of evidence in Aus-
tralia is "when the evidence is the product of unfair or unlawful con-
duct on the part of the police." 54 However, unlike in the United
States where the mere failure to give the Miranda warnings or to
49 17 S.A. St. R. 549 (1978).
50 Id. at 557.
51 Stevenson, Criminal Cases in the NSW District Court: A Pilot Study, in THE CRIMINAL
INJUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 39, at 115.
52 91 C.L.R. 628 (Austi. 1954); see also Sinclair v. R., 73 C.L.R. 316 (Austl. 1946) (a
confession was admitted even though the defendant was considered insane).
-3 1960 V.R. 141 (Vict.); see also R. v. Buchanan, 1966 V.R. 9 (Vict.) (defendant suf-
fering obvious head injuries sustained in automobile accident); see also cases cited in P.
WAIGirr & C. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 773. Cf Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157
(1986) (holding that the use of a volunteered confession by an insane defendant did not
violate the fifth amendment, but leaving the issue of the reliability of such a confession
to the state courts). But see id at 174-88 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (protesting that lack of
free will was also a fifth amendment concern).
54 Cleland v. R., 141 C.L.R. 1, 7 (Austl. 1982) (Gibbs, CJ.) (quoting Bunning v.
Cross, 141 C.L.R. 54, 75 (Austl. 1978) (Stephen & AickinJJ.,joined by Barwick, CJ.)).
The Court went on to observe that the "principal area of operation of this category of
discretion will be in relation to what might loosely be called 'real evidence,' such as
articles found by illegal search, recordings of conversations, the result of breathalyzer
tests, fingerprint evidence and so on." Id.
1990] 109
CRAIG M. BRADLEY
obtain a search warrant when appropriate will automatically result in
evidentiary exclusion,55 the trial judge in Australia must weigh two
competing requirements against each other: "the desirable goal of
bringing to conviction the wrongdoer and the undesirable effect of
curial approval, or even encouragement, being given to the unlawful
conduct of those whose task it is to enforce the law."5 6
In R. v. Ireland,57 the High Court held that photographs of the
defendant's hands should have been excluded from the defendant's
murder trial, where the photographs were taken without consent for
the purpose of allowing an expert witness to evaluate whether
scratches on the hands were caused by handling the alleged murder
weapon. The policeman had told the suspect that he "had to" have
his hands photographed.-5  The court held that "neither at common
law nor under [the] statute59 has a police officer power to require a
person to submit himself to photography for any purpose other than
identification," and further that the photographs should have been
excluded in the exercise of the trial court's discretion.60
As the High Court later made clear in Bunning v. Cross,6 1 this
category of discretion "[b]y no means takes as its central point the
question of unfairness to the accused. It is, on the contrary, con-
cerned with broader questions of high public policy, unfairness to
the accused being only one factor which, if present, will play its part
in the whole process of consideration. ' 62 The specific factors to
consider include the following: 1) whether the "unlawful or im-
proper conduct 63 on the part of the police was intentional or reck-
less on the one hand or merely "accidental" or "unconscious" on
the other;64 2) "the ease with which the law might have been com-
55 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("The prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation
of the defendant unless [he has received the warnings.]").
56 Bunning v. Cross, 141 C.L.R. 54, 74 (Austl. 1978) (Stephen & Aickin, JJ.).
57 126 C.L.R. 321 (Austl. 1970).
58 Id. at 327.
59 Id. at 334; Police Offenses Act, S. AusTL. STAT. § 81 (1960). Under the Australian
Constitution, the High Court is also the highest court for each state and has the final
word on the meaning of each state's statutes. "The High Court shall have jurisdiction
. . . to hear and determine appeals from alljudgments .... [T]he judgment of the High
Court ... shall be final and conclusive." Constitution Act, Austl. Acts. § 73 (1900).
60 Ireland, 126 C.L.R. at 335.
61 141 C.L.R. 54 (Austl. 1978).
62 Id. at 569 (Stephen & Aickin,JJ.). These factors include regard for the "liberty of
the subject," id. at 570 (Stephen & Aickin, JJ.), and that the government not " 'play an
ignoble part' " in the conviction of criminals. Id. (Stephen & Aickin, JJ.) (quoting Olin-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
63 Id. at 569 (Stephen & Aickin, JJ.).
64 Id. at 570 (Stephen & Aickin, JJ.).
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plied with"; 65 3) "the nature of the offence charged"; 66 4) and
whether there was evidence that the rule broken was one which re-
flected a "deliberate intent on the part of the legislature narrowly to
restrict the police." 67 The probative value of the evidence would be
considered only in cases of negligent police violations. 68 In Bun-
ning, however, the High Court, by a four to one majority, held that
evidence of a breathalyzer test would be admissible in a drunk driv-
ing case despite the fact that it had been taken without reasonable
suspicion and without performing a preliminary roadside test as re-
quired by the statute.69
In R. v. Williams,70 the High Court upheld the trial judge's exer-
cise of discretion in excluding the confession of a burglary suspect
who had been arrested at 6:00 a.m. on one day and not taken to the
magistrate until 10:00 a.m. the following day. If an arrested person
is detained, not "for the purpose of enabling him to be brought
before ajustice," but-for the purpose of questioning him, the deten-
tion will be unlawful. 71 However, the Court did not hold that evi-
dence must be excluded in such circumstances; it simply declined to
consider whether the trial judge had exercised inappropriately his
discretion in excluding the evidence. 72
The Ireland decision seems strange in .view of the general reluc-
tance of the Australian courts to exclude evidence. Given the expe-
rience of the ensuing twenty years, one must regard it as an
65 Id. (Stephen & Aickin, JJ.).
66 Id. at 571 (Stephen & Aickin, JJ.).
67 Id. (Stephen & Aickin, JJ.).
68 Id. at 570 (Stephen & Aickin, JJ.). That is, if the police misconduct was inten-
tional, the fact that the evidence was very significant to the prosecution's case would be
irrelevant.
69 Id. at 565 (Stephen & Aickin, JJ.).
70 161 C.L.R. 278 (Austl. 1986).
71 Id. at 285 (Gibbs, CJ.).
72 Id. at 286 (Gibbs, CJ.); id. at 301-02 (Mason & Brennan, JJ.) (this was a mixed
question of law and fact, so the prosecution could not appeal an acquittal). This ex-
plains the seeming inconsistency between Williams and Cleland v. R., 151 C.L.R. 1
(Austl. 1982), in which the Court upheld the admission of a confession of a defendant
(though reversing the conviction on other grounds) who was arrested at 1:00 p.m. and
held until midnight, despite the Court's recognition that it was unlawful to hold the
defendant in custody after 5:30 p.m. without taking him before a magistrate.
Like in Williams, in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), the United States
Supreme Court struck down a conviction on the ground that a seven hour delay (which
resulted in a confession) in taking the defendant before a magistrate violated Rule 5(a)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring such an appearance without "un-
necessary delay." However, this decision has never been applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment and has subsequently been "repealed" by Congress. See Y.
KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 468 (7th ed. 1989).
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aberration on its facts.73 However, its basic recognition of the dis-
cretion to exclude real as well as confessional evidence due to police
misconduct continues as the law. 74
Unlike the Australian "rules" of exclusion heretofore discussed,
this "police misconduct" discretion is actually used from time to
time, at least in confession cases, though not with any regularity or
consistent logic. For example, the South Australian Supreme Court
has been quite firm in enforcing an apparently "automatic discre-
tionary exclusion" 75 in cases in which the police have continued to
question the defendant after he has asserted either his right to si-
lence or to counsel.76 Queensland has a similar, though clearly not
"automatic," rule,77 at least as to assertion of the right to counsel.
However, as one commentator has observed, "in the reported cases
[throughout Australia] where confessional evidence was not admit-
ted, there was evidence which strongly corroborated the accused's
story." 78 That is, courts may have excluded these confessions not
because of procedural irregularities, but because the courts believed
that they were fabricated.
The High Court, while recognizing the "clearly established ju-
dicial discretion" 79 to exclude evidence in cases of police miscon-
duct, has made it clear that such exclusion is not mandatory.80 In
New South Wales, in the extraordinary case of R. v. Merritt and
73 Most Australian state statutes provide for the bodily examination of persons in
custody, including the taking of blood and hair samples; thus, the issue is not likely to
arise very often. See generally P. GILLIES, supra note 14, at 260-61. But see Exparte Welden,
2 N.S.W.L.R. 294 (1971) (excluding breathalyzer evidence obtained in violation of the
statute). Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (noting that the accused can
be subject to photographing, fingerprinting, and the taking of blood, hair, urine, voice,
and handwriting samples for the purpose of using the evidence thus discovered against
him). See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (post-indictment lineup did
not violate accused's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, but did require
the presence of the accused's counsel).
74 Cleland, 151 C.L.R. at 16.
75 This oxymoronic characterization is from P. WAIGHT & C. WILLIAMS, supra note 39,
at 768.
76 R. v. Stafford, 13 S.A. St. R. 392, 398-99 (S. Austl. 1976); accord R. v. Killick, 21
S.A. St. R. 321 (S. Austl. 1979); Walker v. Marklew, 14 S.A. St. R. 463 (S. Austl. 1976);
R. v. Buckskin, 10 S.A. St. R. 1, 5 (S. Austl. 1974).
77 R. v. Hart, 1979 Q.R. 8, 13 (Queensl. Crim. App.); R. v. Borsellino, 1978 Q.R. 507
(Queensl.) (the circumstance that an accused person has been refused access to his solic-
itor will not render evidence of his subsequent interrogation legally inadmissible but it
may well be a ground for the exercise of the discretion to reject his confession). In
Borsellino, the court limited this rule to cases in which "no unreasonable delay or hin-
drance would have been caused to the process of investigation." Barsellino, 1978 Q.R. at
512.
78 Stevenson, supra note 51, at 120.
79 R. v. Ireland, 126 C.L.R. 321, 333 (Austl. 1970).
80 Id. In Ireland, the Court cited R. v. Basto, 91 C.L.R. 628 (Austl. 1954), which had
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Roso,8 t a confession was admitted into evidence despite the fact that
the accused had given the police a written declaration, drawn up by
his solicitor, stating that he would only answer questions in the pres-
ence of a lawyer. The court upheld the trial judge's admission of the
confession on the ground that the defendant had failed to prove that
his written declaration had come to the attention of the interviewing
(as opposed to the arresting) officers. 82 The police claimed that it
had not.8 3 The defendant further claimed that after being cautioned
according to the Judge's Rules and asked if he understood the cau-
tion, he replied, "'No, and you can tell him [another officer] to stop
writing.' "84 This argument was rejected on the ground that his as-
sertion of rights was equivocal.8 5
In addition to the "assertion of rights" cases, the problem of
holding defendants for the purpose of interrogation has attracted
judicial attention in Australia. As discussed, in Williams, the High
Court affirmed a trial court ruling that a confession should be ex-
cluded when obtained during an unnecessary delay in bringing the
accused before a magistrate, thereby enforcing a Tasmanian statute
that required such an appearance "as soon as practicable." 86
To the same effect was an earlier unanimous decision based on
a Commonwealth statute, R. v. Iorlano.8 7 A series of Victorian cases
had similarly excluded confessional evidence based on section 460
of the Victorian Crimes Act, which required that arrestees be
brought before a magistrate "as soon as practicable."8 8 This led the
approved the admission of such a statement in the discretion of the trialjudge. See also R.
v. Lee, 82 C.L.R. 133, 139, 157 (Austl. 1950).
81 19 A. Grim. R. 360 (N.S.W. Grim. App. 1985).
82 Id. at 375. Cf. Arizona v. Robertson, 486 U.S. 675, 687 (1988) ("attach[ing] no
significance to the fact that the officer who conducted the second interrogation did not
know that [the suspect] had made a request for counsel").
83 Meritt and Roso, 19 A. Grim. R. at 372. The court suggested that even if this decla-
ration had come to the attention of the interviewing officers it might not have been
deemed relevant. Id. at 374.
84 Id. at 370.
85 Id. at 370, 376-77. The defendant fuirther claimed that his confession had been
fabricated by the police. Id. at 372; accord R. v. Dugan, 92 N.S.W.W.N. 767 (Grim. App.
1970) (The accused had been refused access to his solicitor, who was elsewhere on the
premises. The evidence was admitted despite the fact that two judges deemed the police
conduct "reprehensible."); R. v. Barron, 1975 V.R. 496, 504 (Vict.) (record of interview
admissible although defendant stated he did not want to answer questions).
86 R. v. Williams, 161 C.L.R. 278, 300-01 (Austl. 1986) (Mason & Brennan, JJ.) (cit-
ingJustices Act, TAs. STAT. § 34A(1) (1959)).
87 50 A.L.R. 291 (Austl. 1983). lorlano interpreted the Customs Act, which provided
that an arrested person should be brought before the magistrate "without undue delay."
88 E.g., R. v. Larson and Lee, 1984 V.R. 559 (Vict.) ("The conduct of the police
demonstrated a flagrant disregard for the rights of the accused."); R. v. Stewart and
Kent (County Ct. 1983) (Just, J.), in CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON POLICE POWERS OF
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Victorian Parliament to amend section 460 to provide that the po-
lice could hold a suspect for up to six hours rather than present him
"as soon as practicable" before the magistrate.8 9 Recently, how-
ever, due to police complaints that six hours was not enough, Victo-
ria has amended the statute again, requiring presentment "within a
reasonable time of being taken into custody." 90 Whether the courts
will interpret this statute more loosely than "as soon as practicable"
remains to be seen.
By the same token, some, but not all, Australian courts have
held that the discretion to exclude evidence should be exercised
when a confession is obtained from a defendant who is in illegal
custody ab initio.91 It would seem to follow from Williams that if un-
duly extended custody should provide the grounds for exclusion of
a confession on the grounds of police misconduct, then so should
custody illegal at its inception. 92 Beyond these cases, Australian law
exhibits only sporadic examples of evidentiary exclusion based on
police misconduct, usually by single state supreme court trial jus-
tices that can, in no sense, be considered to state a "rule" that is
generally applied by the courts of that state, much less the
country.93
INVESTIGATION, CUSTODY AND INVESTIGATION: REPORT ON § 460 OF THE CRIMES ACT
1958 21 [hereinafter CUSTODY AND INVESTIGATION]; R. v. Carter (County Ct. 1983) (Just,
J.), in CUSTODY AND INVESTIGATION, supra.
89 Crimes Act, Vict. Acts (1984). Section 460 allowed the police to apply to a judge
for an additional six hour continuance period but only with the consent of the accused.
Crimes Act, Vict. Acts § 460(3),(7),(10).
90 Crimes Act, Vict. Acts § 464A(l)(c) (1988).
91 Compare R. v. Stafford, 13 S.A. St. R. 392 (A. Austl. 1976) and Walker v. Marklew,
14 S.A. St. R. 463, 467,475, 482 (S. Austl. 1976) (Bray, CJ., &Jacobs & King, JJ., filing
separate opinions) (excluding the confession, in part, due to an illegal arrest) with R. v.
Banner, 1970 V.R. 240, 249 (Vict.) and R. v. Lavery, 20 S.A. St. R. 430 (S. Austl. 1979)
(admitting the confession).
92 In the United States, exclusion in such a case is mandatory, Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590 (1975), unless intervening factors, such as release from custody or consultation
with a lawyer, have broken the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the con-
fession. Miranda warnings alone will not suffice. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200
(1979).
93 For example, in R. v. Soundry (Queensl. Mar. 26, 1980) (Macrossan, J.), in THE
CRIMINAL INJUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 39, at 277, the judge excluded a confession when
the police had given "deliberately false answers" to solicitors who called the police to
locate an accused. And, in the unusual case of R. v. Amad, 1962 V.R. 545 (Vict.), a
confession was excluded on the ground that it was obtained by a mild "cross examina-
tion" of a suspect in custody. But see R. v. Van Aspern, 1964 V.R. 91, 93 (taking a
broader view of police powers to interrogate). The High Court in R. v. Lee, 182 C.L.R.
133, 155 (Austl. 1950), explained, "[A]n invitation to explain established facts can
hardly be called cross-examination in any relevant sense. It is cross-examination in the
sense of breaking down the will and extorting admissions by persons who are being
questioned by the police that is to be reprehended."
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By contrast, there are numerous cases in which the courts have
refused to exclude evidence despite rather extreme examples of po-
lice misbehavior. The most important of these is the recent High
Court case of Van Der Meer v. R., 9 4 in which the five Justices unani-
mously condemned the police interrogation techniques. The proce-
dures included confronting a suspect with the victims and noting his
responses to their accusation, the effect of which was "virtually to
put [the suspect] on trial" at the police station.95 Also, the police,
during an interrogation that had begun at about 10:00 a.m. and con-
tinued sporadically until about midnight, persistently confronted
each suspect "with the alleged statements of the other [suspects] in
an endeavour to break down his denial of guilt," and failed to give
any caution to the two suspects until late in the interrogation. 96 The
three to two majority deemed the techniques "unbelievable" and
"rather bizarre," 97but never flatly held that they were illegal; rather,
the majority upheld the trial judge's decision not to exclude the sus-
pect's admissions.98
The majority further brushed off the fact that, when one of the
suspects finally was cautioned and asked if he was prepared to an-
swer further questions, he replied, "No, not really." 99 Despite this,
he was encouraged to, and did, respond to what the police told him
his fellow suspects had said.100 Oddly, none of the opinions dis-
cussed the Ireland (deterrence of police misconduct) discretion. The
majority confined itself to the reliability issue and, concluding that
the statements were reliable, admitted them.' 0 '
In R. v. Banner,10 2 a suspect was arrested without reasonable
94 62 A.LJ.R. 656 (Austl. 1988).
95 Id. at 665 (Wilson, Dawson & Toohey, JJ.).
96 Id. at 660 (Mason, CJ.). This latter factor was not condemned by the majority,
which noted that the police sergeant was not "satisfied that they had a case against [the
suspects]" until the cautions were issued. Id. at 665 (Wilson, Dawson & Toohey, JJ.).
97 Id. (Wilson, Dawson & Toohey, JJ.).
98 Id. (Wilson, Dawson & Toohey, JJ.).
99 Id. at 658 (Mason, CJ.).
100 Id. at 658, 670 (Mason, CJ., & Dean, J., filing separate opinions). Justice Dean
described this case as "an enactment of how police investigations should not be con-
ducted in this country." Id. at 670 (Dean, J.).
101 E.g., id. at 666 (Wilson, Dawson & Toohey, JJ.). The majority stated that "the
question is not whether the police have acted unfairly; the question is whether it would
be unfair to the accused to use his statement'against him." Id. (Wilson, Dawson & Too-
hey,JJ.). The accused's right to a fair trial my bejeopardized "if a statement is obtained
in circumstances which affect [its] reliability." Id. (Wilson, Dawson & Toohey, JJ.). The
failure to discuss the Ireland discretion in Van der Meer suggests ambivalence on the part
of the High Court as to what its stance should be toward excluding evidence to deter
police misconduct.
102 1970 V.R. 240 (Vict.).
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suspicion, held incommunicado, and interrogated by police for
three days without being taken before a magistrate. The Victorian
Supreme Court, while strongly condemning the police behavior and
declaring the police "guilty... of unlawful acts" and "possibly crim-
inal conduct,"10 3 nevertheless admitted the suspect's murder con-
fession into evidence.' 0 4
In R. v. S. andJ., 105 the South Australian statutory requirement
that arrestees be brought "forthwith" before a magistrate was
avoided by the simple expedient of not formally arresting the six-
teen-year-old Aboriginal suspects until after "many hours" of inter-
rogation. 10 6 The two suspects had been taken separately to police
headquarters. 10 7 Although they had been told that they were "not
under arrest," the police admitted that they would have arrested
them had the suspects not agreed to go to the police station, and
"the suspects believed [arrest] would be the result of non-
compliance." 1 0 8
While the Australian courts' attitudes toward exclusion of con-
fessions on any of the grounds set forth by the High Court can char-
itably be described as erratic, at least it is apparent that courts are
alive to the possibility that they could, through enforcement of ex-
clusionary principles, put pressure on the police to follow the rules,
if only there were more clear-cut "rules" to follow. In contrast, Aus-
tralian courts have failed to ever exclude the fruits of an illegal search
103 Id. at 249. The court noted that during the first 15 hours of detention, before the
suspect gave his first confession, the police did not even have reasonable grounds for
suspecting him of any crime, or that a crime had even been committed.
104 Id. at 251-52. The court, as in Van der Meer, held that it was not "unfair to use the
confession." However, this case was decided before Ireland, where the "deterrence of
police misconduct" head of discretion was established. But see R. v. Larson and Lee,
1984 V.R. 559 (Vict.), a more recent Victorian case excluding evidence in a case of simi-
lar, though less serious, police misconduct.
105 8 A. Crim. R. 88 (S. Austl. Crim. App. 1983).
106 Id. at 98 (White, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 94 (Mitchell, J.).
108 Id. (Mitchell, J.). The police also failed to have a parent, guardian, or representa-
tive of the Aboriginal Rights Movement present at the interrogation as required by po-
lice interrogation rules. Id. at 91. But see R. v. W., 2 Q.R. 308 (Queensl. 1988) (Dowsett,
J.) (on virtually identical facts, a Queensland trial judge excluded confessions of Aborigi-
nal juveniles as both involuntary and unfair).
In R. v. Byczko and McCloud, 30 S.A. St. R. 578 (S. Austl. Grim. App. 1982), the
fact that the defendants were "detained without lawful authority," id. at 584, and be-
lieved that they were not free to go (one even had his overalls taken away by the police)
was not sufficient to require exclusion of a confession. This, despite the court's conclu-
sion that "the infringement of the appellants' legal rights was undoubtedly serious." Id.
at 585; accord R. v. Narula, 22 A. Crim. R. 409 (Vict. Grim. App. 1986) (illegal delay in
arraignment-no exclusion of confession).
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in a reported case. 0 9
As discussed, every state has statutory rules governing
searches110 that are similar to American rules, and in numerous
cases the courts have struck down warrants and ordered the evi-
dence returned due to failure to set forth reasonable and specific
grounds."' However, these decisions do not necessarily preclude
the police from proceeding with a prosecution and reobtaining the
same evidence by subpoena.' 2 Moreover, these decisions are solely
warrant cases, in which the police are already making an effort to
comply with the law. More in need of scrutiny are warrantless
searches and seizures, but these appear largely to have escaped judi-
cial notice.
In R. v. Tilev,"13 one of the rare cases in which this issue has
been considered, the police entered a flat without a warrant and
without reasonable suspicion and found significant evidence of a
murder. The trial judge, while recognizing his discretionary power
to exclude the evidence under Bunning, refused to do so on the
109 In a letter to the Author, Professor Peter Sallman agreed: "[A]s far as I am aware
there has not been any significant or reported case in which evidence has been excluded
because of the illegality of the means of its production." Letter from Peter Sallman to
Craig M. Bradley (May 18, 1989).
Such exclusion does occur sometimes in unreported cases, but the experience of
one former prosecutor was that evidence was only excluded "if it was unimportant."
Interview with Gary Trimble, in Canberra, Austl. (July 1989); see also P. GILLIES, supra
note 14, at 241. Gillies cites three Australian cases in support of the proposition that
"when real evidence has been improperly or unlawfully obtained . . . the trial judge
[may] exercise his discretion to reject it." In all three cases, the evidence was, in fact,
admitted. Trimboli v. Onley, 37 A.L.R. 38 (Austl. 1981); McIntyre v. Sing, 30 A.L.R.
299 (Austl. 1979); Crowley v. Murphy, 28 A.C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1979). R. v. Ireland, 126
C.L.R. 321 (Austl. 1970), and R. v. Weldon, 15 S.A. St. R. 320 (S. Austl. 1977), involving
illegal seizures but not searches, are the only cases discovered involving exclusion of
real evidence on any ground. Even evidence obtained by an illegal wiretap is admissible
in cases punishable by more than three years imprisonment. P. GILLIES, supra note 14, at
289, 290 (citing Telecommunications Act, Austl. Acts § 7 (1975)). However, the High
Court has held that documents which would not be admissible in court anyway due to
legal professional privilege may not be seized pursuant to a search warrant. Baker v.
Campbell, 153 C.L.R. 52 (Austl. 1983).
110 See supra note 12.
111 Parker v. Churchill, 9 F.L.R. 334 (Austl. Full Fed. Ct. 1986); Tran Nominees Party
Ltd. v. Schleffler, 20 A. Crim. R. 287 (S. Austl. 1985); Hedges v. Grundman, 19 A. Crim.
R. 303 (Queensl. Full Sup. Ct. 1985); R. v. Official Prescription Spectacle Makers Party
Ltd., 25 A. Crim. R. 143 (Austl. Fed. 1978).
112 In fact, in Hedges the court ordered the return only of private medical files seized
by the police that had no relevance to a criminal case. Hedges, 19 A. Crim. R. at 304.
The court explicitly did "not extend the order to other property seized at the time of the
execution of the warrants in view of the pending criminal proceedings." Id. (Campbell
& Connelly, JJ., concurring). This despite the court's finding that the warrants in ques-
tion were "bad on their face." Id. at 303.
113 33 S.A. St. R. 344 (S. Austl. 1983).
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ground that the police conduct, while illegal, was not "wholly outra-
geous."'l 4 Thus, despite the pronouncements of the High Court in
Bunning, Australian courts still seem, in practice, to cleave to the
British view that "the interest of the state must excuse the seizure of
documents, which seizure would otherwise be unlawful, if it appears
in fact that such documents were evidence of a crime committed by
anyone."115
Discussions with Australian defense attorneys keenly aware of
police violations in the confessions area did not reveal much con-
cern about illegal searches." t6 In part, this could be explained by
the high proportion of arrests followed by a confession-ninety-six
percent in one study."17 If the police can obtain (or fabricate) a con-
fession, they will not have as much need to search. Another expla-
nation lies in the finding of the Law Reform Commission that "very
many of the searches of premises undertaken by police officers are
made . . . at the 'invitation' or at least the consent of the occu-
pier."" t8 Still, in contrast to the large number of cases involving
the suppression of illegally seized evidence in the United States de-
spite the existence of a consent doctrinet 19 and a keen desire by
police to obtain confessions, it is inconceivable that there are not a
significant number of cases involving evidentiary seizures by Austra-
lian police in which the propriety of the search (or the existence or
voluntariness of the consent) should at least be discussed. 120
114 Id. at 354; see also Milner v. Anderson, 42 A.C.T.R. 23 (Austl. 1982) (evidence of a
search of defendant's person admitted despite the lack of reasonable suspicion or
consent).
115 J. OXLEY-OXLAND, NSW POLICE LAW HANDBOOK 1806 (1988) (quoting Elias v.
Passmore, 2 K.B. 164 (1934)). Oxley-Oxland opines, however, that if the police conduct
were "oppressive ... it would not be right to allow the Crown to rely upon it." Id.
116 E.g., Interview with Ben Salmon, Canberra, Austl. (Feb. 13, 1989); Interview with
Terry, Canberra, Austl. (Feb. 23, 1989).
117 Stevenson, supra note 51, at 108-09. This figure apparently was a percentage only
of cases which resulted in conviction, whether by guilty plea or trial and did not include
dismissals and acquittals.
118 LRC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, supra note 7, at 91. One study showed that, in a six
month period in 1975, 62% of the searches conducted by the (former) Narcotics Bureau
and Customs Department were made by consent. Id. The Commission recommended
that police should produce a signed acknowledgement claiming consent and that "the
absence of such acknowledgement would be prima facie evidence" that the search was
not consented to. Id. at 92. Obviously, it is believed by the Commission that the police
are as willing to fabricate consents to search as they are confessions. In his American
study, the Author found that consents were advanced as a justification for the search in
17% (37 of 223) of the appellate cases studied. Bradley, Are the State Courts Enforcing the
Fourth Amendment?, 77 GEo. LJ. 501 (1989).
119 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (defendant need not be informed
of his right to withhold consent nor need the consent be written).
120 This impression is confirmed by two cases where the court's description of the
police behavior seemed to involve an illegal search, even though that issue was not dis-
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Clearly, the lack of enthusiasm of the bar for these issues reflects the
futility of raising them.
A particularly striking example of not only the relative rarity of,
but also the lack of concern in the Australian legal system for, illegal
searches is provided by the 1978 Beach Report. 121 The study sets
forth twenty cases of gross violations of individual rights by Mel-
bourne police including false arrest, fabricated confessions, and the
brutalizing of arrestees.122 Only one of these cases involved a
search at all.' 23 In that case, the police, acting with reasonable sus-
picion but apparently without a search warrant or exigent circum-
stances, broke into a flat occupied by two suspects, pushed one of
them out of a window to the street thirty feet below, and kicked him
as he lay on the ground with broken limbs. 124 Yet, despite the obvi-
ous illegality of this search, the Board of Inquiry made no mention
of the fact that no warrant was obtained, focusing instead on the
subsequent police brutality. While the brutality was certainly the
most important feature of the incident, it is still inconceivable that
an American analysis of a similar incident would not point out, as a
matter of first principle, the illegality of the warrantless entry.
Such extreme police behavior is not limited to the past. Three
examples of police conduct that would have "shocked the con-
science" of American courts were reported in the Canberra Times.
In the first, Melbourne "police completely demolished a house in a
search for clues to the Walsh Street police murders, but found noth-
ing."' 25 This was done on the authority of a bankruptcy judge after
the owners of the house had been evicted for failure to keep up their
mortgage payments, apparently because they were in police
custody.126
The second case is bizarre: "Armed and hooded police burst
into an outer Brisbane home, fired stun grenades, tied up the owner
cussed. In R. v. Narula, 22 A. Grim. R. 409 (Vict. Grim. App. 1986), the court, in dis-
cussing whether a confession was admissible, mentioned that the heroin was located by
the police during a "surreptitious search" of a hotel room. Id. at 413. Since no search
warrant is mentioned, it is presumed that this was the result of an illegal entry. In an-
other case, R. v. Kushkarian, 16 A. Grim. R. 416 (N.S.W. Grim. App. 1984), the appel-
lant was arrested for possession of a sawed-off shotgun, and later charged and convicted
of armed robbery, after the shotgun "was found [by police] in the back of his motor
vehicle." Id. at 417. There is no discussion of how the police came to look in the back of
his vehicle, which was parked at his home.
121 See supra note 7.
122 Id. at 31-49.
123 The Sellers Matter, in BEACH REPORT, supra note 7, 486 et seq.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Canberra Times, Jan. 6, 1989, at 4.
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and then realized they had raided the wrong house."1 27 The owner,
a fifty-five-year-old pensioner, reported that "three masked men had
dragged him at gunpoint into the [living room] and tied him up with
tape." 128 "They threatened to kill anyone who moved," he said. 129
Moreover, they bulldozed the front fence.' 30 All this, not in a
search for a mass murderer, but for a "dangerous bank robber."''1
No mention of a warrant appears in the article. 132 This debacle was
widely reported in the newspapers and was obviously considered ex-
tremely bad form on the part of the police. However, my impres-
sion was that it was not so much the manner in which the police
treated the suspect that was considered so outrageous, as the fact
that they had raided the wrong house.
Finally, in Perth, a police elite tactical response group "terri-
fied" a sleeping family by smashing into their house in the middle of
the night armed with shotguns and knives and wearing masks, ap-
parently without a warrant, after a complaint from a neighbor that
shots had been fired during a noisy domestic argument five hours
earlier. 133
Of course, similar horror stories could be found in American
papers. However, nothing in America since the Wickersham Report
in 1930134 could match the consistent patterns of police misconduct
exposed in the Lucas and Beach Reports, which studied police mis-
conduct in Brisbane and Melbourne in the late 1970s.135
IV. AUSTRALIAN PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
As the cases illustrate, and as Australians who have studied the
system agree, "the 'law' of criminal investigation in Australia is in a
totally unsatisfactory state."' 136 Despite this recognition, however,
neither of the two major models of reform-the Law Reform Com-
mission reports on criminal investigation (1975) and evidence
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
13' Id.
132 Canberra Times, Jan. 15, 1989, at 2.
133 Canberra Times, Feb. 22, 1989, at 6.
134 ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS, OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE NATIONAL
COMMITrEE ON LAw OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, S. Doc. No. 307, 71st Cong., 3d
Sess. 30, 209-10 (1930).
135 LUCAS REPORT, supra note 4; BEACH REPORT, supra note 7.
136 p. SALLMAN &J. WILLs, supra note 3, at 40. The sanctions currently used have not
"been a particularly effective deterrent to overly enthusiastic law enforcement activity."
LRC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, supra note 7, at 136. "The voluntariness rule suffers from
many deficiencies." LRC EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 87.
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(1987)- recommends the adoption of the American-style automatic
or mandatory exclusionary rule.15 7 This despite the Law Reform
Commission's recognition that the current practice results in very
little exclusion and that the failure to exclude evidence may en-
courage reliance on illegally obtained evidence.' 3 8 Why is an auto-
matic exclusionary rule rejected when, by providing a relatively
certain sanction for rights violations, it should have the effect of de-
terring (or at least tending to deter) such police misconduct? 3 9
The answer given by the Law Reform Commission is instructive to
Americans: "the American rule has [its] limits."' 40 They point to
the ways in which the United States Supreme Court has cabined the
operation of the exclusionary rule:
An accused person cannot invoke the rule if the evidence was obtained
in breach of another's rights. The rule does not apply to breaches by a
private individual rather than a state official. It does not apply so as to
prevent the presentation of illegally obtained evidence to a federal
grand jury. And the rule does not apply where the evidence is admit-
ted not on the issue of the accused's guilt but on some collateral issue
such as his credibility as a witness. This kind of narrow distinction between
evidence proving quilt and evidence proving that an accused who says he is not
guilty is not worthy of belief as a witness tends to bring the law and lawyers into
contempt. 141
The above are exceptions to the "automatic" exclusionary
rule-cases in which the rule does not operate despite concededly
illegal police behavior. The other way in which the United States
Supreme Court has mitigated the seeming harshness of a rule that
automatically excludes evidence in the event of a violation is by
137 LRC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, supra note 7, at 141; LRC EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at
94 ("In the Commission's view, the policy concerns do not justify automatic exclusion.
The policy concerns compete and operate with varying force depending on the circum-
stances of a particular case. The situation is one in which a discretionary approach is the
most appropriate." But, "once misconduct has been established, the burden should rest
on the prosecution to persuade the court that the evidence should be admitted."); see
LRC EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 171 (Draft Legislation § 79) (court should have discre-
tion to exclude admission if "it would be unfair to the defendant to use the evidence").
138 Id. at 94.
139 See Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics
Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1016 (1987) (finding that the exclusionary rule does deter
police search and seizure violations). The former Attorney General of Maryland agrees.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 954 n.13 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140 LRC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, supra note 7, at 136.
141 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 897 (establishing
a "reasonable good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule in case of police violations
in search warrant cases).
For criticism of the Supreme Court's "standing" doctrine, see Kamisar, Does (Did)
(Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than an Empirical Proposi-
tion?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 635 (1983).
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loosening the definition of what constitutes a "violation,"1 42 for ex-
ample by establishing a search warrant "requirement" and then cre-
ating over twenty exceptions to it.143
Of course, these kinds of exceptions are not necessarily inher-
ent in a mandatory exclusionary rule. The Court could instead en-
force its "warrant requirement," and impose no "standing" or "use
for impeachment purposes" limitations on the operation of the ex-
clusionary rule, as the dissenting Justices have consistently urged.14 4
Clearly, the Court's reluctance to have a clearcut rule that applies
without exception is due to the Justices' belief that this will lead to
an unacceptably high number of criminals going free because the
police blundered.
Is a discretionary rule, then, the only honest answer? Certainly,
the discretionary rule currently in force in Australia, which is "often
mentioned but rarely acted on,"1 4 5 can hardly be considered an ade-
quate safeguard for civil liberties.' 46 The Law Reform Commission
proposals to remedy this problem deserve serious consideration. 4 7
They would require that when the police have broken the rules in
obtaining evidence "the court shall not admit the evidence unless it
is, on the balance of probabilities, satisfied [by the prosecution] ' 48 that
admission of the evidence would specifically and substantially bene-
fit the public interest without unduly prejudicing the rights and free-
doms of any person." Factors to consider include the seriousness of
the offense, the seriousness of the police misconduct, and the extent
to which the evidence in question might have been lawfully
142 As the Law Reform Commission pointed out, the mandatory exclusionary rule
"tempts courts to reduce the protection of the substantive search-seizure rules by hold-
ing no illegality has occurred in order to avoid important evidence being excluded."
LRC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, supra note 7, at 140.
143 See Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MicH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74
(1985); Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68J.
GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198-204 (1977). g
144 See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 928-29 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (terms the majority view
an "abandon[ment] altogether [of] the exclusionary rule"). Justice White, dissenting in
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 157 (1978), put the problem well: "If the Court is trou-
bled by the practical impact of the exclusionary rule, it should face the issue of that
rule's continued validity squarely instead of distorting other doctrines in an attempt to
reach what are perceived as the correct results in specific cases."
145 LRC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, supra note 7, at 136.
146 See Kamisar, supra note 6, at 5-6 (rejecting a discretionary approach).
147 The Australian Law Reform Commission proposes statutes that would only be ap-
plicable to the federal government, but which can serve as models for reform of state
laws as well.
148 LRC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, supra note 7, at 209 (Draft Legislation § 71). Cur-
rently the defendant bears the burden of convincing the Court that the discretion should
be exercised in his favor.
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obtained. 149
Certainly the Australian experience to date makes a compelling
case against discretionary, and in favor of mandatory, exclusion. 150
However, Australia's current mandatory rule against involuntary
confessions also does not seem to be producing very consistent re-
sults. On the other hand, the American mandatory rule has led to
the courts waffling, and hence creating confusion, as to the rules
which require exclusion when broken. 15 1
This much can be said for a nonmandatory rule: as a matter of
deterrence, it is surely not necessary to exclude evidence every time
the police err. If the police knew that the evidence would be ex-
cluded, for example, two-thirds of the time, they would likely be just
as deterred from illegal searches as they are now. The trouble with
this approach is that it has to be random. Otherwise, whatever the
standards, the police will learn them and adjust their conduct ac-
cordingly. Thus, the standard proposed by the Law Reform Com-
mission of considering the seriousness of the case 152 will tend to
have little or no deterrent effect in serious cases because the police
will know in advance that almost anything they do will not lead to
the exclusion of evidence. It is hard to imagine that merely shifting
the burden of proof to the prosecution will cause judges who have
virtually never excluded evidence on the basis of an illegal search to
suddenly begin doing so with enough regularity to ensure police
compliance with the rules. 153
149 LRC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, supra note 7, at 209 (Draft Legislation § 71). A
more recent Law Reform Commission report takes essentially the same view but deletes
the "substantially" provision, merely requiring that "the desirability of admitting the
evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence that has been [illegally] ob-
tained." LRC EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 190 (Draft Legislation § 119). It also adds
other factors to consider including "the importance of the evidence in the proceeding"
and "whether the impropriety... was contrary to or inconsistent with a right of a person
recognized by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." Id.
150 See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 521-24 (6th
ed. 1986) (discussing the inadequacy of the pre-Miranda "voluntariness" test in the
United States).
151 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
152 See Kaplan, supra note 6, at 1046 (proposing that evidentiary exclusion never be
allowed in certain serious cases).
153 As a supplement to its discretionary rule, the Law Reform Commission urges the
creation of an external police review board to discipline the police for rights violations.
LRC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, supra note 7, at 143-44; LAw REFORM COMMISSION, COM-
PLAINTS AGAINST POLICE-REPORT No. 1, App. F, at 83-106 (1975). The Commission
believes that the combination of this board and the discretionary exclusionary remedy
will cause the rules of criminal procedure to be "taken very seriously indeed." LRC
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, supra note 7, at 144.
Criminal procedure will not likely be taken seriously, however. First, it is highly
doubtful that convicted criminals or their lawyers will be motivated to bring, and suc-
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It was my strong impression as a prosecutor in Washington,
D.C.,-an impression confirmed by a recent study in Chicago-that
the mandatory exclusionary rule works.154 If evidence is excluded
or likely to be excluded, due to police misconduct the prosecutor is
upset. He registers a complaint with the police hierarchy or directly
confronts the officers involved or does both, and (at least in Wash-
ington and Chicago) the police discipline the offending officer and
endeavor to prevent such exclusions of evidence in the future. 155
Thus, in my view, the mandatory rule works and the Australian pro-
posal for continuation of a (slightly modified) discretionary rule is a
mistake.
A more recent Australian Law Reform Commission proposal
imposes a stringent requirement on the use of admissions obtained
during interrogation of persons "reasonably suspected" of crime, 156
declaring that the confessions are "not admissible" unless 1) the de-
fendant is cautioned as to his right to silence and to the possible use
of his statements against him, and 2) his admission is tape recorded.157
cessful if they do bring, actions before such a board. Such a board seems most useful as
a supplement to a mandatory exclusionary rule to vindicate the rights of innocent peo-
ple aggrieved by police misconduct, rather than as a substitute for such a rule. Second,
it seems unlikely that the police department, not facing loss of evidence due to officers'
misconduct, would take the disciplinary recommendations of such a board very seri-
ously. Professor Amsterdam has observed, "Realistically, no extra-departmental body
has the information, resources and direct disciplinary authority necessary to control the
police effectively and consistently." Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 428 (1974); accord Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the
Exercise of Police Authority, 58J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 160, 162 (1967).
154 Orfield, supra note 139, at 1017 ("On an institutional level, the rule has changed
police, prosecutorial and judicial procedures; on an individual level, it has educated po-
lice officers in the requirements of the fourth amendment and has punished them when
they have violated those requirements.").
155 "The police department instituted an officer rating system that made the loss of
evidence a personal liability to officers by ensuring that suppressions negatively affected
an officer's ability to retain her assignments and, to a lesser extent, to obtain promo-
tions." Id. at 1027-28.
156 The proposal also includes those who "ought reasonably to have been suspected."
LRC EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 169 (Draft Legislation § 74). This is somewhat broader
than the "custody" requirement in the United States which does not, for example, apply
to a brief detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop, Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420 (1984), or to a suspect who volunteers to come to the police station to talk
about a crime, California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983). Since both of these people
were certainly "reasonably suspected" of crime, the proposed Australian rules would
apply to them. Such a broad application might not be advisable, however, since the line
between "custody" and "no custody" is not completely clear. In Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491 (1983), the Court developed an approach that is much clearer than the line
between people who ought and ought not to have been reasonably suspected of a crime.
Moreover, the concerns expressed in Miranda are not as great in such brief detentions.
157 LRC EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 169 (Draft Legislation § 74). If it was not reason-
ably practicable to have made such a recording of the actual admission, a recording of
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Admissions "influenced by violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrad-
ing conduct, whether toward the person who made the admission or
toward some other person, or by a threat of conduct of that kind,"
also are not admissible. 15  In other words, the Commission has pro-
posed a mandatory exclusionary rule.
These recommendations are eminently sensible. They will
largely eliminate police fabrication of confessional evidence while,
by requiring confessions to be taped, increase their value in the
prosecution's case. Indeed, videotaping confessions, when practica-
ble, would be an even more desirable requirement.' 59 The one
thing missing from the proposal, evidently left out in deference to,
or in fear of, the police lobby,1 60 is a specific limitation, similar to
the former Victorian statute previously discussed,' 6 1 on the amount
of time a suspect can be held for questioning before being taken
before a judge or magistrate. By adopting in Victoria, and propos-
ing nationwide, a comprehensive statutory approach to confession
law, Australia is prepared to cover the field much more thoroughly
than the patchwork approach of the United States Supreme Court,
focusing not just on concerns that the defendant be adequately in-
formed, as the Supreme Court has done, 162 but also on matters such
as the reliability of confession and the length of interrogation.
Surely, from the point of view of police and defendants alike, this is
an approach that should be emulated.
V. A STATUTORY APPROACH IN AMERICA?
The Australians are surely right in assuming that statutes are
the correct means of declaring rules of criminal procedure. The
problem in America is not the mandatory exclusionary rule, but the
the suspect confirming the admission will suffice. Also, confessions made in the pres-
ence of a suspect's attorney or, if the attorney was not reasonably available, a person
chosen by the suspect ("not being an investigating official") are also admissible.
If none of the above were reasonably practicable, the confession may be admitted
anyway, though it is hard to imagine a situation where an after-the-fact recording would
not be reasonably practicable. See also supra note 23.
158 LRC EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 168-69 (Draft Legislation § 72).
159 Chief Justice Mason shares this view, noting that videotaped confessions would
expedite criminal proceedings.. Canberra Times, March 21, 1989, at 10. While not re-
quiring video recording, the Commission also made it clear that it was not prohibited.
LRC EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 92. The AMERICAN LAw INsTrrtrE, MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 130.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1975), proposed a similar
tape recording requirement for the United States.
160 See supra note 8.
161 See supra note 23.
162 For example, Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), limiting the length of
federal interrogations, has never been applied to the states.
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fact that the criminal procedure "rules," the violation of which leads
to exclusion, are totally inadequate.' 63 I have previously proposed
that the Court could improve, at least its fourth amendment law, by
requiring either that searches simply be "reasonable," without any
attempt being made to set more detailed rules, or that the warrant
requirement be strictly enforced, subject only to a narrowly drawn
exigent circumstances exception. 164
As a judicial approach to the problem, either of these two ap-
proaches would be an improvement over the present system. How-
ever, neither of these approaches is entirely satisfactory, and my
experience in the Australian "laboratory" caused me to recognize
more clearly why not. Both approaches assume that the only way to
deal with the problems of criminal procedure is through court-made
rules based on the constitutional rights contained in the fourth,
fifth, and sixth amendments.1 65 Such "rights oriented" approaches
are fundamentally flawed as methods of governing police behavior
for at least two reasons: incompleteness and lack of clarity.
A. THE INADEQUACY OF THE COURT-MADE RULES
One problem with utilizing direct interpretations of the Bill of
Rights as a means of declaring rules of criminal procedure is that
the Bill of Rights frequently does not have any obvious application
to the regulated conduct. The Warren Court, feeling compelled to
act by the failure of legislative bodies to regulate the police,' 66 tor-
tured the language of the fifth amendment unmercifully in Miranda.
It held that a clause that forbade a person from being "compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself" required the po-
lice to warn suspects of their rights to both silence and counsel
before they could be asked to give voluntary, noncompelled state-
ments prior to the beginning of the criminal "case." 167 That this
163 Bradley, supra note 143, at 1472-73.
164 Id. at 1471-72.
165 This assumption is widely held in America by the Court and criminal procedure
scholars alike. E.g., Whitebread, The Burger Court's Counter-Revolution in Criminal Procedure:
The Recent Criminal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 24 WASHBURN LJ. 471, 472-
73 (1985) (Supreme Court should set forth clearer rules of police conduct).
166 See Allen, The Judicial Quest for PenalJustice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases,
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 525.
167 Of course, before the Court could torture the fifth amendment, it had to torture
the fourteenth to make the fifth applicable to the states. This result also had no histori-
cal support. E.g., Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
REv. 929, 934 (1965).
To recognize that Miranda required a distortion of the fifth amendment is not neces-
sarily to disagree with the result. Miranda, being a legislative-type rule, does provide
relatively clear guidance for police. Compare U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL
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exercise in judicial legislation damaged the Court is well
accepted. 168
In other cases, the Court, adhering more closely to the constitu-
tional language, has been forced to reach unsatisfactory results. A
good example of this is found in United States v. Wade.169 In Wade the
Court was obviously determined to curtail abuses in lineup proce-
dures. Certainly, lineups as such had nothing to do with the fourth
amendment' 70 and, not wanting to unduly hamper police investiga-
tions, the Court was constrained to hold that the fifth amendment
was not violated by requiring the defendant to appear, and even to
speak, in a lineup. This left the Court with the sixth amendment
right to counsel as its only vehicle for lineup reform. But, as anyone
who has ever attended a lineup knows, this is no place for counsel.
There are no witnesses to examine, no arguments to make, and no
evidence to offer. Counsel may object if he wants, but the police are
free to ignore his objections.' 71 What the Court really wanted was
to ensure that lineups were fair; the best way to do this is to require
that they be photographed and tape recorded (or videotaped) and
that these records be produced in court. However, even the Warren
Court was apparently unable to find an amendment it could squeeze
hard enough to yield this result. Consequently, it devised an incom-
plete rule, based on constitutional footing that was vulnerable to
being effectively overruled by a plurality in Kirby v. Illinois172 which
held that the "right to counsel" does not attach until "adversary ju-
dicial proceedings" have begun. 173 Since lineups are usually held
before "adversary judicial proceedings" have begun, the Wade
Court's attempt to set rules for lineups was largely nullified.
The Court is constantly torn between memory and desire: its
memory that "nothing in the Constitution vests in us the authority
to mandate a code of behavior for state officials"174 and its desire to
POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATrORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION
(Feb. 12, 1986, with addendum ofJan. 20, 1987) (Miranda not constitutionally justified)
with Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1987) (Miranda is consti-
tutionally justified).
168 See F. GRA-Am, THE SELF INFLICTED WOUND (1970).
169 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
170 Of course, if the defendant is seized off the street for the purpose of appearing in a
lineup, he can challenge that seizure on fourth amendment grounds; but that is a differ-
ent issue. Normally, if a non-arrested suspect is wanted for a lineup, a court order must
be obtained.
171 See Polsky, Uviller, Ziccordi & Davis, The Role of the Defense Counsel at a Lineup in Light
of the Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall Decisions, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 273, 278, 285-86 (1968).
172 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
173 Id. at 688-91.
174 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986).
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protect the rights of criminal defendants or establish a clear rule for
the police to follow. The result has been a patchwork approach that
finds the Court overly involved in the details of some interests of
criminal suspects-for example, the need to be warned of rights-
and oblivious to other, equally important interests. 175
The Court's work in the confessions area well illustrates this
point. Since declaring the Miranda rule, the Court, in the ensuing
twenty-odd years, has contented itself with interpreting and reinter-
preting that decision. What is "custody"? What is "interrogation?"
What if the defendant asserts his right to silence or counsel? 76 But
in focusing on the warnings the Court has overlooked other, equally
fundamental aspects of the interrogation process: how to guard
against police fabrication of confessions; what to do if the police in-
duce a confession by trickery;177 what to do if, after warning the de-
fendant, the police engage in the psychological ploys discussed in
Miranda such as the "Mutt and Jeff" technique;17  and how long the
interrogation may last.
In Miranda the Court "encourage[d] Congress and the States to
continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of pro-
tecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient [law]
enforcement. .".79 But the Court has coopted the field. One can
look, almost in vain, through a criminal procedure book 80 for any
reference to statutory material in an area that every other country,
including our common law mentor, Britain, considers to be appro-
175 Professor Francis Allen has expressed similar concerns about the "criminal proce-
dure revolution":
These comments do not attack the Court's attempt to expand the rights of defend-
ants in criminal cases, rather they indicate that narrowing one's focus to the Bill of
Rights can lead to a failure to view criminal process issues in the proper perspective
of defining the judicial role in that process. The failure to question the judicial role
in assuring fairness in the criminal process may lead to a restriction of the rights of
the defendant as easily, and perhaps even more easily, than it may lead to an expan-
sion of those rights.
Nowak, Due Process Methodology in the Postincorporation World, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 397, 401 (1979) (discussing Allen, supra note 166, at 540); accord Kadish, Methodology
and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE LJ. 319 (1957).
176 See C. BRADLEY, Y. KAMISAR, J. GRANO & J. HADDAD, SUM AND SUBSTANCE: CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE §§ 6.6200, 6.6300, 6.7000 (2d ed. 1988).
177 The Court ignored such trickery in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493
(1977).
178 The Court condemned the "Mutt and Jeff" technique, wherein an interrogator
who is hostile to the defendant is replaced by one who is sympathetic in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 452-53 (1966).
179 Id. at 467.
180 See, e.g., Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 150. Only in the relatively
minor matter ofjoinder and severance of defendants is there any detailed discussion of
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and federal statutes play a major role only in the
chapter on wiretapping. State statutes are, of course, not mentioned at all.
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priately dealt with by statute.18 1 Since Supreme Court rulemaking is
limited by the Court's docket, the facts of the cases before it, and its
frequent unwillingness to "mandate a code of behavior for state offi-
cials,"' 1 2 the result is a patchwork of rules that cover some, but ig-
nore equally important aspects of criminal procedure.
B. THE CLARITY PROBLEM
In addition to the incomplete nature of the Court's criminal
procedure rules, they suffer from a second serious flaw: lack of clar-
ity. Rules of criminal procedure should take a form that can be
posted on the stationhouse wall to be read and followed by the po-
lice without requiring them to delve into the mysteries of innumera-
ble cases to find out what they are supposed to do.'8 3 Of course,
statutes, like cases, can leave many unanswered questions. How-
ever, a statute has two major advantages over case law as a method
of declaring rules for police to follow.' 8 4 First, it is not subject to
the case or controversy limitation. Future cases can be anticipated
and dealt with definitively. For example, in Michigan v. Mosley, 18 5 the
Court sought to resolve the issue of what the police should do when
a defendant, after receiving his Miranda warnings, states that he
does not want to speak. The facts of Mosley were unusual in that the
defendant, after invoking his right to silence, was questioned two
hours later by a different detective about a different crime.' s 6 The
Supreme Court held that this questioning was permissible.' 8 7 Mos-
ley, however, did not resolve the much more common issue of
whether a defendant, once he has invoked his right to silence, can
181 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60 (Gr. Brit.). In Australia, "it is also
generally accepted that what is needed is a comprehensive code setting out with as much
particularity as possible the rights and duties of police, suspects and others concerned in
the criminal investigation process." P. SALLmAN &J. WiLLs, supra note 3, at 23. Of
course, continental countries have had such codes for decades. See, e.g.,
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] (W. Ger.) (Code of Criminal Procedure); accord Friendly, supra
note 167, at 930 (citation omitted) ("How complex the subject is, and how much it calls
for the compromise that is the genius of legislation rather than the everlasting aye or nay
of constitutional decision."); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTrrTE, supra note 159.
182 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986).
183 "Of course there has to be an exclusionary rule. I don't want this to be a police
state. There have to be guidelines. The problem is that the guidelines aren't clear...
[and] the Supreme Court is not making the law dear." Orfield, supra note 139, at 1052.
Professor Uviller has observed that the Miranda warnings, which are similar to the
kind of legislative rules I am proposing, are, literally, posted on the stationhouse wall at
the precinct he studied in New York. H.R. UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 206 (1989).
184 The problems with case law as a means of developing rules of procedure are dis-
cussed in Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DuE LJ. 1.
185 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
186 Id. at 97-98.
187 Id. at 107.
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ever be questioned again by the same police officers about the same
crime. This issue remains unresolved twenty-four years after Mi-
randa was decided. In Edwards v. Arizona, 188 the Court held that a
defendant could not be questioned further after he had invoked his
right to counsel. In Oregon v. Bradshaw,18 9 the Court found an ex-
ception to Edwards when the defendant "initiated" further conversa-
tion. Bradshaw was not decided until seventeen years after Miranda,
during which period the issue remained unsettled.190 But it all
could have been resolved in advance by a statute which provided the
following:
If the defendant indicates that he wishes to remain silent or to commu-
nicate with counsel, questioning must cease unless: a) Counsel is pro-
vided; or b) The defendant initiates further communication; or c) Only
in the case of invocation of the right to silence, police want to question
the defendant about a different crime.191
The other problem of clarity with case-made rules is caused by
stare decisis. When a legislature wants to declare or change a rule, it
simply does so. There is no need to account for previous, similar
rules in the process. Courts, in contrast, are bound by stare decisis.
Consequently, if a court seeks to establish a new rule that departs
from precedent but does not want to openly overrule the previous
case-which stare decisis suggests it should be loath to do-one of
two things may happen: either the new rule may be altered to make
it a less radical break than it might have seemed, or the precedent
may be distorted for the same reason. 92 The first result may limit
the effectiveness of the new rule, the second will cause confusion as
to the import of the rule and subject it to being distinguished in
later cases. A statute is a much more straightforward method of rule
making.
C. THE STATUTORY SOLUTION
The problem with statutes is two-fold. The first is simply get-
188 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
189 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
190 See also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (finally resolving the issue raised,
but not decided, 22 years before in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1964), of
whether the right to counsel attached when, during interrogation, the lawyer asked to
see the client).
191 This is assuming that the legislature had wanted to adopt the rules of Mosley, Ed-
wards, and Bradshaw. See Johnson, A Statutory Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine, 24 AM.
GRIM. L. REV. 303 (1986) (setting forth a comprehensive interrogation statute).
192 As Professor Alshuler has pointed out, "The open disapproval of past precedents
might... undermine the Court's position in American life less than the repeated invoca-
tion of disingenuous distinctions." Alshuler, Failed Pragmatism, 100 HARV. L. REv.. 1436,
1453 (1957).
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ting them passed. Thirteen years and three statutory schemes after
criminal procedure reform was first attempted in Australia, nothing
has yet been done.19 3 However, such an effort in the United States,
devoted largely to codifying and simplifying current Supreme Court
law, and to making the rules more comprehensive, rather than to
changing the law's ideological content, might prove more success-
ful. At least it is worth a try.
The second "problem", in both the United States and Australia
is federalism. The criminal investigation bills proposed in Australia
would only apply to the federal authorities because the federal gov-
ernment has very limited powers vis-i-vis the states. It is generally
assumed that Congress's power is similarly' constrained in the
United States. This is a serious problem because such fundamental
rights must be enforced uniformly nationwide, not subjected to the
differing whims of state legislatures or state courts. This would
seem to be the major reason why the Supreme Court has under-
taken the job of declaring nationally applicable "rules" of criminal
procedure.
In my view, this "problem" is a chimera in the United States.
Congress has thepower to prescribe a national code of criminal proce-
dure. If Congress can provide a tort remedy for violation of consti-
tutional rights by state officers,' 9 4 then it can also legislate the
precise obligations that those rights place on the police, as well as
an exclusionary remedy. The fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments
have all been applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment.' 95 That amendment provides in section 5 that "Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
193 The Criminal Investigations Bills of 1976 and 1981 were rejected by Parliament.
A more recent proposal by the Law Reform Commission is currently being studied by
governmental agencies and seems to have better prospects for passage. Telephone con-
versation with Stephen Mason, Secretary and Director of Research, Law Reform Com-
mission (Mar. 2, 1989).
The police lobby has been highly influential in opposing and defeating previous
efforts at reform. "The Victoria Police responded to the findings.., of the Beach In-
quiry with remarkable vigour and hostility, and fought a largely successful campaign...
to prevent the implementation of its procedural recommendations." P. SALLMAN & J.
WILLIS, supra note 3, at 18.
In response to the Criminal Investigation Bill of 1981, the President of the Police
Federation of Australia and New Zealand threatened a police strike if the procedural
protections of the bill were enacted. 26 REFORM 63 (Apr. 1982). Senator Evans, then
Attorney General, "suggested that the police response to the Bill ... demonstrated 'a
profound indifference to the constraints of existing law.'" Id.
194 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
195 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth
amendment).
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sions of this article."' 96 Since the criminal procedure amendments
have been incorporated into the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, it is clear that Congress is now empowered to
enforce them "by appropriate legislation" 197-that is, by a national
code of criminal procedure. Such a code would provide the uni-
formity necessary for enforcement of federal constitutional
rights,1 98 combined with a relative certainty as to the scope of those
rights. 99 This is currently unattainable by reference to precedent
bound Supreme Court decisions.200
Congress could base a code on its general authority to enforce
the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments without necessarily tying
each rule to a specific constitutional violation and thereby avoid the
"patchwork" problem. Thus, Congress could declare that fair con-
duct of lineups implicates defendants' fifth and sixth amendment
rights and that lineups must therefore be photographed and tape
recorded in order to be admissible at trial, without specifying pre-
cisely which constitutional phrase required this rule. In the past the
states through members of Congress might have resisted such legis-
lation as trenching on matters that were exclusively of state concern.
However, in the thirty years since Mapp, everyone has become so
accustomed to criminal procedure as a federal matter that it seems
unlikely that serious states' rights arguments would be raised.
Other political concerns might incapacitate Congress from ade-
quately performing this function; nevertheless, Congress has the
power to enact national legislation and the criminal procedure sys-
tem would be much improved if it did.
This approach is reminiscent of that used in the loansharking
196 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
197 The holding of the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that the fourteenth amend-
ment gives Congress no authority to regulate the behavior of private individuals, would
have no bearing here since Congress would be limiting the conduct of a quintessential
state/local governmental agency-the police. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
650-51 (1966) (holding that Congress has independent authority to interpret the provi-
sions of the fourteenth amendment). Cf Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Mar-
riage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81.
198 Such a code would not, of course, prevent individualized states from holding their
own police to higher standards, as they are currently free to do. Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714, 719 (1975). But it would provide uniformity as to the bottom line, the most
fundamental rights.
199 For an example of such a code, see AMERICAN LAW INSTrIUrE, supra note 159.
200 It might be argued that the power to "enforce" includes only the power to provide
remedies, not to declare rules. This seems an unduly crabbed reading of the fourteenth
amendment, especially in view of the statutes already enacted to "enforce" it, such as 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1988). A power to "enforce" without the
power to flesh out the vague terms of the amendment with statutory rules would be
largely meaningless.
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statutes, 201 where Congress simply declared that loansharking af-
fected interstate commerce without requiring proof of the effect in a
given case.202 A grateful Court, relieved at last of its burden of car-
rying the code of criminal procedure on its own shoulders, would
surely support such legislation.
But if the Court is no longer to declare the rules of criminal
procedure, what will its role be? Professor Francis Allen foresaw
this in 1975:
A new allocation of responsibilities is required. The role of the Court
will remain critical. It has shown its capacity to identify and dramatize
problems in criminal justice administration; this role is an essential
catalyst for reform. The Court will have to make the ultimate decisions on the
constitutional validity of the solutions devised. Nevertheless, its role is better
adapted to review than to initiation. If categorical rules for the system
are needed, it is better that other institutions formulate most rules. 203
The Supreme Court would have not only to determine the validity
of such congressional rules but, no doubt, resolve questions left un-
answered by the rules. This is, as a practical as well as a theoretical
matter,204 what courts do best.
In his introduction to this Symposium, Professor Ronald Allen,
while tacitly agreeing that Congress has this power, disagrees that
this proposal should be implemented. He notes that Congress, un-
like the Supreme Court, is subject to "special interest groups, log-
rolling, the concerns for reelection, uninformed voting, and the
like." 20 5 Having once investigated Congress as a federal prosecutor
(in connection with the so-called "Koreagate" bribery scandal) I
would be the last person to indulge in idealized characterizations of
201 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1988).
202 The Supreme Court approved this exercise in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971).
203 Allen, supra note 166, at 542 (emphasis added). Professor Packer, recognizing that
the Court's actions were due to "a law-making vacuum into which, rightly or wrongly, it
[saw] itself as having to rush" deemed the Court's establishment of criminal procedure
rules as "moves of desperation." Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 J.
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCIENCE 238, 240 (1966). This means that "the rules
of the criminal process, which ought to be the subject of flexible inquiry and adjustment
by law-making bodies having the institutional capacity to deal with them, are evolved
through a process that its warmest defenders recognize as to some extent awkward and
inept." Id.
204 The arguments in this Article are based on utilitarian concerns. This Article does
not address itself to the oft-debated question of whether it is/was appropriate, in our
constitutional system, for the Supreme Court to take on the power to declare rules of
criminal procedure. For a discussion of this issue, compareJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIs-
TRUST (1980) with Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: -The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981).
205 Allen, The Pressures and Prospects for Change, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7
(1990).
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that institution's capacities. But since Congress is the only body
that can produce a comprehensive, nationally applicable code of
criminal procedure, then it is to Congress, with all its faults, that we
must go. In an area such as criminal procedure, where economic
interests are not generally at stake, some of the problems cited by
Professor Allen would be minimized. Also, it is not obvious that the
Supreme Court, whose members have virtually no experience in the
criminal justice area, is less subject to the problem of "uninformed
voting" than Congress, with its capacity to hold hearings and seek
expert advice. Finally, since Congress would be aware that their
rules would be carefully scrutinized by the Supreme Court, it seems
likely that they would endeavor to craft those rules to meet Supreme
Court standards. Congress has proved capable of producing rea-
sonable federal criminal law. I see no reason to doubt that it could
perform as well in the area of criminal procedure.
VI. CONCLUSION
A study of Australian criminal procedure reveals that the Aus-
tralians have embarked on one bad and one good road to resolving
the problems of criminal procedure. The discretionary exclusionary
rule has not worked in Australia and merely tinkering with it by
shifting the burden of establishing admissibility to the prosecution
seems unlikely to solve the problems, especially since the judges
have shown little inclination toward deterring police misconduct
through evidentiary exclusion under the current discretionary
system.
On the other hand, the Australian states have largely adopted a
statutory approach to regulating police-at least in the search
area-and it appears that federal legislation may be imminent. This
is as it should be. While the United States Supreme Court must be
commended for its heroic efforts on behalf of criminal defendants,
rulemaking is what is needed, and rulemaking is a task for which
courts are singularly unsuited.206 The time has come for the United
States Congress, legislating pursuant to its powers under the four-
teenth amendment, to take over this effort from the Court and pro-
mulgate a national code of criminal procedure which safeguards
constitutional rights and provides clear, comprehensive rules for the
206 Professors Bator and Vorenberg, the Reporters of the Model Code of Pre-Arraign-
ment Procedure, recognized the "peculiar appropriateness of legislation to the solution
of the major issues of criminal procedure" in 1966. Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention,
Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66
COLUM. L. REV. 62, 63-64 (1966).
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police to follow. 20 7 While politics would undoubtedly cause such
rules to vary somewhat from the civil libertarian ideal, such variance
has already occurred anyway due to recent Supreme Court rulings.
It is far better to have realistic rules that will really be enforced than
idealistic ones that will not be. And, if Congress deviates too far
from fundamental rights concerns, the Court can always strike down
its statute(s).
207 As this article was going to press, I discovered that this proposal had already been
made, twenty-five years ago in this very Journal. The author of that article, without the
benefit of seeing the tangled mess that criminal procedure law has become, must be
given credit for unusual prescience. Dowling, Escobedo and Beyond: The Needfor a Four-
teenth Amendment Code of Ciminal Procedure, 56J. Crim. L., Criminology & Police Science
143 (1965).
